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BRIEF MENTION.

Professor DAVID M. ROBINSON's elaborate review, in the *Classical Weekly* of April 4, of Mr. MOONEY's *Apollonius of Rhodes* reminds me of a passage in the Introduction to that work. In a footnote on p. 29 Mr. MOONEY tells us that there are seventy-six developed similes in the *Argonautica* (5833 lines): in the *Iliad*, 15600 lines (why not 15693?), there are about 200 (why not 196?), so that the proportion is nearly the same. I have not been at the pains to count after Mr. MOONEY or his authority. So much juggling is done with figures, and there is so much current abuse of the statistical method, in which I myself was one of the pioneers, that I am not impressed by Mr. MOONEY's handling of his facts. Homer repeats his similes so often—the lion alone ramping through the poems as does his heraldic brother on mediaeval coats of arms—that the proportion for Apollonius is very much enhanced; and then the character of the similes, the spheres from which they are drawn, ought to be taken into account. Nothing seems to be plainer than that Apollonius deliberately set himself to outdo Homer in this domain as in others; and so to triumph over his μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν adversary, whose Hekale was misspelled sometime ago as Hekate, at which the shade of Apollonius must have rejoiced.



The subject of Apollonius' similes deserves closer study than it seems to have received, and I should like to turn loose upon it the author of a book that has just come to the editor's table—*Συγκριτική τροπική τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν ἐγκρίτων χρόνων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς λογοτεχνίας*, Budapest, 1913. The work embraces the tropes of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, of Pindar, Aischylos, Sophokles, Euripides and Aristophanes. It is provided with a bibliography of more than ninety titles, and the author, WILHELM PECZ, whose name refuses to submit wholly to the Greek alphabet and appears in the hybrid form Γουλιέλμου PECZ, has appended a list of his own writings, which shew that he has been working on this line for many years. Most of his books and articles have been published in Hungarian, but some of his work is accessible in German; and his name will be recognized by the readers of that most readable of philological

journals, the *Neue Jahrbücher*. It is a pleasure to note that he has not overlooked J. T. Lees on the Metaphor in Aeschylus (*Studies in Honor of Gildersleeve*), though J. T. Lees appears as I. T. Less. We Americans must be content to have our names misspelled, as happened also to J. W. Kern, who figures as J. W. Kun in the new Brugmann-Thumb, p. 427. PECZ's material is sorted under three great heads—Synecdoche, Metonymy, and Analogy—the last name comprising, after Gerber, Metaphor, Comparison, and Allegory. The great differences naturally lie in the third class. Poetry, theatre, song, music, gymnastics, dance, athletics, architecture, statuary, painting, mensuration, political life, very rarely form terms of comparison in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, while they occur about fifty times as often in Pindar, ten times as often in the four dramatic poets. Whilst hunting, fishing, horse-breeding, horse-racing, cattle-raising, bee-keeping, gardening, vine-dressing, husbandry, merchandise, navigation, do occur in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, they occur eight times as often in Pindar and four times as often in the four dramatists. Cooking, rather frequent in Aristophanes, occurs in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but is lacking in Pindar and the tragic poets. The minor handicrafts—working in gold, silver, and wax, carpentry, pottery, tanning—abound in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and Aristophanes, are favoured to some extent in Pindar, but are seldom employed in tragedy. The primacy of religious life in *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is shewn by the tropes taken from mythology and ritual, not so much in comparison with the two devout men—Pindar and Aeschylus—as in comparison with Sophokles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, who all three together furnish only a few more than Pindar, and not so many as Aeschylus alone. Nature supplies more figures to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* than to Pindar and the four dramatic poets, forming as they do one-half of all the tropes employed in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, whereas in Pindar and the four dramatists they constitute only a fourth, shewing to PECZ's mind that the civilization of the period of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is more primitive than that of the Periklean period. That there are so few tropes taken from war in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is due to the fact that they reflect in the main Ionic and not Achæo-Aeolic civilization, thanks to the Ionic refashioning—a point made by Platt on Homer's *Similes* (E. J. P. 1906), who, according to PECZ, ought to have acknowledged his obligations to his forerunner. The figures taken from war are left over from the Achæo-Aeolic original, like the Aeolic glosses and the ghastly anatomical descriptions of wounds. In Sophokles, who lived for the most part in the peaceful epoch of Perikles, figures from war are in the main lacking. They are more numerous in Euripides and Aristophanes, witnesses of the

Peloponnesian War, whilst they abound in Pindar and Aischylos, so that the tropes reflect the spirit of the age.

In proportion to the figures of analogy, says Herr PECZ, synecdoche and metonymy play a very small part. In Pindar they yield one-ninth, in Sophokles one-third, in Euripides one-half, whereas there is a perceptible decline in Aristophanes. Now, according to PECZ, synecdoche and metonymy are the fruit of ratiocination; analogy, of imagination and fancy. From this it follows that there is a gradual decline in the power of the imagination, which mounts again in Aristophanes, whereas ratiocination, which we hardly encounter in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, gradually gains strength in Pindar, Aischylos, and Sophokles, culminating in Euripides, and noticeably declining in Aristophanes. Finally, of the figures of analogy the most highly developed is the comparison or simile. There are four times as many comparisons in the *Iliad* as metaphors, only twice as many in the *Odyssey*. On the contrary, in Pindar and the four dramatists the metaphor forges ahead. The *Iliad* leads not only in the number, but also in the development of the comparison, the detailed comparisons or similes being more than twice as many as the brief comparisons, whereas the *Odyssey* holds the balance; and in Pindar and the four dramatists the short form leads. In the *Iliad* there is only one allegory. In Pindar the allegories are many and detailed. Here as elsewhere Homer is the natural, Pindar the conscious, master artist of the language.

I have not undertaken to count after PECZ any more than I have counted after MOONEY, and have forborne to interrupt PECZ's demonstration by comments. So I might have remarked that Sophokles actually outlived Euripides, and could not have been insensible of the atmosphere of the Peloponnesian War; and the question whether metaphor is an abridged comparison or comparison an expanded metaphor is one about which much might be said. Language is nearly all metaphor, and the large use of comparison in Homer is the sign of an advanced stage of poetic art, hardly consistent with primitive conditions (A. J. P. II 108; R. M. Mayer, *NJB.*, 1908, S. 63).

Of course, PECZ's figures are only approximate, and we have not to deal with the small dust of statistics. Seven thousand

iambic trimeters fall far short of seven thousand heroic hexameters. And what is one to do with Pindar, Bakchylides, the choruses of the dramatic poets? Tycho Mommsen is content with a rough estimate, but the soul of the true statistician will not rest satisfied with such rude guesses, though there are few who would follow the laborious method of Professor C. W. E. Miller (J. H. U. Circular, August, 1883, p. 142), who many years ago, moved by the spirit of the then dominant school, took into account the metrical value of each foot for the purpose of ascertaining the true proportion of the various elements in the comedies of Aristophanes. The main result was eminently satisfactory, and ῥθος of metre corresponds to ῥθος of play. Alas! for the great Babylon we had built upon the Schmidtian foundation. 'The owls shall dwell there and satyrs shall dance there'—and, moreover, Professor John Williams White shall marshal his militant enoplics there. It is therefore just as well that PECZ did not go into the business of decimals to the fourth place. His time will come.

By the way, in the early days of my Greek seminary, more than thirty years ago, similar investigations were undertaken into the relative frequency of metaphor and comparison in Plato, with the interesting result that metaphors lead in the so-called Socratic and presumably earlier dialogues, whereas similes come to the front in the later dialogues. This is as it should be, and therefore suspicious. Dr. E. G. Sihler's dissertation was never published, and the whole subject was re-studied by Dr. George Olaf Berg in a Johns Hopkins University dissertation of 1904. Dr. Berg used Sihler's work for the purpose of verifying and completing his own collection of examples, but whilst he finds that there is a development in the use of metaphorical language, he considers it unwarranted to fix in detail the order in which the dialogues were written solely by this development.

In the April number of the *Classical Quarterly* Professor GOODELL has discussed the meaning and the history of *χρή* and *δεῖ*. The subject has interested me for many years, and in order to avoid entangling alliance with Professor GOODELL's paper, I will first state how the matter lay in my own mind before I read his illuminating and suggestive essay. That of the two rivals, *χρή* and *δεῖ*, *χρή* is nearer to *προσῆκει*, *δεῖ* to *ἀναγκαῖον*, is an old story. It is formulated, for instance, in a

little manual of Greek synonyms by Voemel, published in 1822, in which he cites the gloss of Hesychios *χρή· πρέπει, καθήκει*, and tells us that the personal equivalent is *οφείλω*. In Plato's Phaedrus 233 D, *χρή* and *προσθήκει* are treated as equivalents: *εἰ χρή τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, πρὸς ἡ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν*. Whether the speech is by Lysias or a clever pastiche, it is faithful to Lysias' preference for *χρή*. *δεῖ* comes in at the close of the speech (234 C). *δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* (sc. τοῦ *χαρίζεσθαι* not 'love', as Jowett has it) *μηδεμίαν, ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι*. Jowett translates *δεῖ* by 'ought to', as he translates the preceding *χρή*'s; but it would be easy to see in *δεῖ* the *sine qua non* condition of granting favours. But Plato—if it is Plato—is too much a slave to the charms of the great goddess *Ποικιλία* to be a safe guide in the matter of synonyms, which he builds and unbuilds again (cf. A. J. P. XVI 92).

Indeed, the relative frequency of *χρή* and *δεῖ* in different spheres and in different periods cannot have escaped any careful student of the orators, and I have alluded to it (A. J. P. XXVI 249) lightly as a matter of course, as one would allude to *σύν* and *μετά*, as one would allude to *ἐθέλω* and *βούλομαι*—familiar ear-marks all.¹ It has long been observed that there is but one *δεῖ* in Homer,² and there is but one *δεῖ* in Pindar, as there is but one *βούλομαι*. A convenient test is furnished by that paraenetic ragbag, the Theognidea. A rapid count reveals nearly a score of 'duty' *χρή*'s, not a solitary *δεῖ*. *χρή* gives way to *δεῖ* in the later Attic orators, and finally *δεῖ* reigns. Eleusis is merged in Athens. *χρή* beats *δεῖ* in Antiphon, *χρή* beats *δεῖ* in Lysias, whereas, not being a professional, Andokides, 'the gentleman orator', as I have nicknamed him, is nearer to the later usage. With Isokrates the break begins. It is not necessary to count. A footrule will serve. The

¹ In the *Περὶ πολιτείας* attributed to Herodes Atticus, Wilamowitz has noted, as who would not, the strong archaic flavour, which he considers characteristic of Herodes, whereas Drerup, largely on the ground of that very same archaic flavour, has surmised in the little document the hand of a political pamphleteer prior to 404. See his edition, Paderborn 1908. In this performance *χρή* beats *δεῖ* five to three, and in the same line of observation *λέξαι* (bis), *λέξει*, *λέξειε* are decidedly old-fashioned (C. W. E. M., A. J. P. XVI 162; XXXI 117). By the way, that Drerup should have retained *ἴσως ἂν τις εἴπη* (30) as an Homeric formula seems to me even more absurd than the retention of *ἂν ἐρεῖ* (Pind. N. 7, 68) as an Homeric reminiscence, *ἴσως* would kill any Homeric formula.

² The types made J. H. H. Schmidt (Syn. 3, 702) say that there is only one *χρή* in Homer. Of course, he meant *δεῖ*. A. J. P. XXVII 480.

orators all follow. There are f. i. four times as many *δεῖ*'s as *χρή*'s in Hyperides, and all the *χρή*'s go without much coaxing into the *προσῆκει* category—the category of moral obligation. Heaven bless the indexes! There is no index to Isaios, so that I have had to count. In Isaios *δεῖ* draws off gradually, but winds up a good third ahead, a warning against averages made on the basis of segmental reading (A. J. P. VIII 221, footn.).

If the etymology of *χρή* were clear (A. J. P. XXXV 112), there would be comparatively little trouble. But as *δεῖ* is practically lacking in the earliest time, we must trust to mere indicia, *σημεῖα* not *τεκμήρια*, of a later day. There is a large group of related words meaning 'want'. *χρή* (compare *χρηζω*) might be defined as a 'felt want', whereas *δεῖ* means 'lack', which is a want that may or may not be felt. Feeling comes in, as it often comes in, with the middle *δέομαι* or with the practical preposition *ἐν* in *ἐνδεῖα*. The greater feeling in *χρή* makes it more poetical. The connexion of *χρή* with *χρῶμαι* is insisted on by all who discuss the subject. *χρῶμαι* means, 'I come into touch with', and *χέρ* is supposed to mean 'the toucher', 'the feeler'. The practical Greek consulted the oracle about the management of affairs, not about speculative questions. *χρησμός* is not to be divorced from *χρήσιμος*. Theologians tell us that our oracles, the Scriptures, teach us what man is to believe concerning God and what duty God requires of man. The duty comes first to the Greek. The sanctity of the oracle lies about both prediction and preachment, but preachment dominates. So a moral character cleaves to the grammatical and rhetorical commonplace called *χρεία*. *χρή* being more poetical than *δεῖ*, is bound to lose in the long run, and *δεῖ* wins. In the only passage in which Pindar uses *δεῖ* he uses *χρή* also, and 'though he was no synonym-monger, he delighted in the play of his own work' (Intro. Essay xliii) and in the passage referred to he uses *χρή* and *δεῖ* with all the exactness that any synonymist could desire (O. 6, 28): *χρῆ ἢ τοῖνυν πύλας ὕμνων ἀναπιννάμεν αὐταῖς· πρὸς Πιτάναν δὲ παρ' Εὐρώτα πόρον δ' εἰ σάμερον ἐλθεῖν*. There was a moral obligation, a *προσῆκει*, resting on the poet to open the gates of songs to the *σθένος ἡμόνων*. The *force majeure*, the outside force of the driver, compelled the mules to finish their journey on that very day. But taking a lesson from Pindar, I am content to do my duty by opening the gates to Professor GOODELL—*Ianua patet: intrate* (A. J. P. XXV 478)—and recognize the dire necessity of getting out No. 138 in time, which will be impossible, if I keep on this track of synonyms, which is as endless as translation, to which it ultimately belongs.

Professor GOODELL says that 'in the post-Homeric development the aspect of $\chi\rho\eta$ which persisted, which $\chi\rho\eta$ retained as long as it retained anything, was that which would most easily connect it with the oracle, as the expression of settled religious and moral order', and after discussing the use of $\chi\rho\eta$ and $\delta\epsilon\iota$ in selected passages of poetry and prose, for he does not attempt exhaustive statistics, he concludes with the following survey of the ground covered:

The circle of development is complete. From the Homeric breadth and simplicity of $\chi\rho\eta$, through the poetic wealth of the fifth century and the fulness and precision of the earlier half of the fourth, we have reached the comparative poverty of the Hellenistic period, which nevertheless knows, and can use if it will, the resources of the preceding age.

If the lesson can hardly be called a new revelation, any more than Professor GOODELL's article on $\mu\eta$ (A. J. P. XXXIII 437), still, as in that article, the detail work is illuminating and suggestive, and well deserves more ample discussion than I can give it here.

That mobile adjective, the participle, had a gradual development, and over-analysis in the early stages is a mistake. But when we begin to analyze, let us analyze correctly. There is an adversative participle that deals with opposing forces. The negative is $\alpha\upsilon$, which sometimes holds its own in the face of an imperative. There is a concessive participle, with the negative $\mu\eta$ —necessarily post-Homeric. They are often slumped under the head 'concessive'. With his unlovely mania for a nomenclature of his own, Stahl tells us that the participle is used both as a conditional concessive and a causal concessive—causal concessive being what ordinary mortals call adversative—and the whole section S. 668, 2 is a mess. $\mu\eta$ with the participle is taboo in the early time and without a negative alternative 'the conditional-concessive' could not attain the development which it was destined to reach in prose. As for Stahl's 'causal concessive' (adversative) even in the pre-Herodotean and pre-Attic time $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau\epsilon\rho$ is not absolutely necessary, as Stahl maintains. The naked participle can be found by looking for it (e. g. E 433), though, as I have repeatedly urged, analysis is best left alone. In my Pindar (cxi) I say: "The adversative relation is expressed in Greek chiefly by the participle. The language is sometimes kind enough to give warning of this by $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau\epsilon\rho$ and $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$, but often no notice is given, and failure to understand it is charged to stupidity". The adversative relation comes out by contrast. 'Whereas' is causal or adversative as the case may be, and so is *cum*, not to mention $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota$, about which an

unnecessary pother has been made in the commentaries. Statistics as to the proportion of the adversative participle with or without the sign of *καίπερ* or *ὅμως* for the classical time are not at hand, but the author of a treatise—*Syntax of the Participle in the Apostolic Fathers*, HENRY B. ROBISON (University of Chicago)—has been at the pains to count the proportion in these later representatives of Greek usage, and finds the concessive force emphasized by *καίπερ* in seven instances, or in only 25 per cent of the occurrences. It is the only statement in the laborious exhibit of which I can make use.

The arrival of HUGO MAGNUS's elaborate critical edition of *Ovid's Metamorphoses* (Weidmann) reminds me of a super-serviceable, finical correspondent, who called the attention of the Editor of the Journal to the fact that there were seven feet in my quotation from Ovid, Met. ix 5. 6, apropos of the Civil War (A. J. P. XXXIV 493). Who but 'a monster of an ass, an ass without an ear', would have needed the lesson, and what reasonable man would expect an inscription to indicate the end of one verse and the beginning of another? Such be the amenities of international criticism. The late Robinson Ellis was much concerned when a leading Hellenist undertook to teach me the difference between *χρόνος* and *καιρός*, the difference which Hypereides makes in his Epitaphios: οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ὁ παρὼν ἱκανός, οὔτε ὁ καιρὸς ἀρμόττων τῷ μακρολογεῖν. I bade my good friend not to weep for me. Ordinarily I do not answer such strictures. *Remorsurus petor* is not my motto, but in that case I could not keep from giving some return lessons which were needed but not heeded (A. J. P. XXVII 111). My memory holds many specimens of such criticism. One American friend, who had glanced through my Latin grammar, gently called my attention to the false quantity in 'pālam'—it was not the 'palam' he had in mind—and a critic of my Persius printed in his review of that ill-starred edition as a part of his indictment the list of *errata* I myself had furnished the reader. If the said 'superserviceable, finical' person had known his Ovid and had understood the circumstances in which I quoted 'nec tam turpe fuit vinci, quam contendisse decorum est', he would have stayed his officious hand. Let me give the context:

Triste petis munus, quis enim sua proelia victus
commemorare velit? referam tamen ordine, nec tam
turpe fuit vinci, quam contendisse decorum est.

It was Poseidon that overcame in Ovid, as it was Poseidon that overcame in our Civil War, if we are to believe Charles

Francis Adams; and this gives additional point to the quotation. However, the last line, which I have not cited, would not have appealed to the thousands and tens of thousands of the Unreconstructed in those far-off days,

magnaque dat nobis tantus solacia victor,

and even now when the question arises as to the imposition of a higher morality and an ordered civilization upon an alien race, he who has imbibed the Greek spirit will say to himself—*φέρει οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄνευ τῆς αὐτονομίας.*

The fertilizing slime of slang that even scholars look upon with generous allowance, brings me no comfort for the passing of the racy English of our colonial grandfathers. I never open a school-edition of Shakespeare without a sickening sense of loss. Here are some of the words and phrases that I find explained in notes and glossary for the benefit of the rising generation: 'prolixity', 'burn daylight', 'the longest liver takes all', 'green sickness', 'spoke him fair', 'cannot choose but', 'living' ('all her living'), 'utter' (bad money), 'chop logic'. But all this helps one to understand the criticisms that are levelled at the survivors of the period to which I belong, and that is something.

The age of literary allusion is past, never to return (A. J. P. XXXII 113). It is better to write things quotable than to quote. Both habits, it is true, are dangerous to the moral tone, but, if one must quote, absolute exactness is a paramount duty; and so I apologize for quoting from memory (A. J. P. XXXV 107) a poem by Armand Renaud on the theme of Dioecious Love—*εὐδαίμονες οἴσιν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἀγευστος εὐνή*—where l. 3 for 'inconnu' read 'ignoré'.

The completion of the Third Edition of *The Golden Bough* has seemed to friends and admirers of Dr. Frazer a fitting occasion for offering some token in recognition of his great services to learning; and it is proposed that a Frazer Fund for Social Anthropology be established to make grants to travelling students of either sex, in order to promote a department of Anthropology, which Dr. Frazer has always been eager to advance. Contributions may be made to the Secretary and Treasurer, Mr. F. M. Cornford, Trinity College, Cambridge, England.